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INTRODUCTION
This paper is an attempt to study the Korean eco­
nomic problems, and to describe and evaluate the various 
forms of foreign economic aid to Korea during the period 
1945-1955.
Korea was reborn in 1945, but as two Koreas on the 
tiny peninsula. No communication has been exchanged be­
tween the two parts since 194#. Thus, in this paper "Korea” 
refers only to the southern part except in the historical 
portions and where otherwise evident.
Korea had by 1955 been the recipient of approximate-
1
ly $1,436 million of foreign aid under the various names5 
the Government and Relief in Occupation Areas of the United 
States Army (1945-1949)* the Economic Cooperation Adminis­
tration (1949-1951), the Foreign Operation Administration 
(1951-1953), the Civil Relief in Korea (1950 — ), the
United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (1952  ), and
the International Cooperation Administration (1953 ---)«
In addition, Korea has received annual military assistance 
of more than $300 million through the Korean-American Mutual
1The Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Review, 1957, 
(Korea: The Research Department, Bank of Korea, 1957),
IV, 221.
1
2
2Defense Agreement of 1950, and Agricultural surplus aid
by United States Public Law 480 of 1954* Ninety percent
of the total aid received by Korea has come from the United 
3States*
The entire question of foreign economic aid, however, 
is extremely complex because it involves nationalist aspira­
tions and international relations as well. For this reason, 
a brief economic history of Korea since annexation by Japan 
in 1910, including a summary of important political develop­
ments leading to the establishment of a divided Korea, is 
presented in Chapter I. This furnishes a background for 
understanding the current economic problems of Korea. In 
Chapter II, a more detailed treatment of the economic pro­
blems of Korea since the end of World War II is given. 
Chapter III is a discussion of specific measures of foreign 
aid to Korea during the period, 1945-1955o Finally, an 
evaluation of past foreign economic aid with suggestions 
for future foreign aid and its effective utilization, are 
presented in the concluding chapter.
2
Ibid., I, 181.
3Ibid., I, 182.
CHAPTER I
THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF KOREA 
A. THE KOREAN ECONOMY, 1910-1945
Characteristics of the Economy, The Korean economy
has, as yet, nothing to distinguish it from that of any
other typical Asian country. First, the economy has been
predominantly agricultural. The farming population was
1
73.6 percent of the total population in 193 3® Second, 
such basic industrial resources as coal, iron ore, and 
hydroelectric potential have not yet been developed on a 
large scale. This has effected a low productivity in agri­
culture due to adherence to traditional methods. Third, 
the pressure of population on resources has become evident 
and made for poverty. Furthermore, thirty-six years of 
Japanese colonial rule were, in some important respects, 
detrimental to Korean economic development.
Korea has an homogeneous population of over 30 million 
and is located between the Chinese mainland and the Japanese 
islands. It is separated from Manchuria by the Yalu and
Grajdanzen, Andrew J., Modern Korea, (N.Y.: The
John Day Company, 1944). p. 79®
3
4
Tumang rivers and adjoins Russian territory along a twelve-
mile length* The rest of the land is stretched out between
the Yellow Sea and Tonghae Sea, with a coastline of 11,000
miles* The Korean peninsula contains about $5,000 square 2
miles* Geographically this peninsula is divided into the 
mountainous northern part and plains-like area of the southern 
region* The northern portion of the peninsula is compara­
tively rich in natural resources such as coal, iron ore, 
tungsten, graphite, gold and other important minerals for 
industrial development, as well as forests of spruce, fir 
and pine* The southern part of the peninsula is well suited 
to the growing of agricultural products, which are mainly 
rice, millet, wheat, barley, and beans* With 11,000 miles 
of coastline and the mixing of the cold Okhotsk current with 
warm current of Mexico, the coastal waters along the penin­
sula are well suited for fisheries*
Because of its geographical location, the Korean 
peninsula has been influenced by Chinese culture and trans­
mitted to Japan through 4,300 years of history. In recent 
years, the peninsula has become one of the areas of inter­
national conflict. This began with the Japanese occupation 
of Korea during the period 1910-1943°
Effects of Japanese Occupation, 1910-1945« After the
2Lee, J. H., A Handbook of Korea, (Seoul: Office
of Public Information, Republic of Korea, 1955)«» p« 2.
5
treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, Japan dominated the Korean
3peninsula and finally occupied it in 1910. During the
period 1910-29, the Imperial Japanese government created
the administrative machinery of control and set the pattern
4for exploitation of Korea. Economic domination increased 
during the period 1920-30, and until 1945 Japan made her 
colony a source of supply of goods for its growing militarism..
The basic Japanese interest in the Korean economy is
well indicated by Table I, page 6. This table shows that 
agriculture in Korea was 46.4 percent of gross production 
as compared with 16.1 percent in Japan, while industry in 
Korea was 37*3 percent and 76.7 percent in Japan. It means 
that the Korean peninsula was furnishing to Japan*s rapidly 
growing industry at that time a supply of food and raw 
materials, and a market for its manufactured goods. Thus
Japanese colonial policy was primarily planned to keep the
5peninsula an agricultural area.
An increased output of rice was forcibly exported to
Japan during the Japanese colonial rule. The total rice
^McCune, George M., Korea.Today, (N. Y.: Harvard
University Press, 1950), pp. 20-24. By 1936, the total 
officials in Korea were 37,552, of which Koreans numbered 
35,232 and Japanese 52,270.
4Ibid.
5Ibid.
6
TABLE I
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS VALUE OF 
PRODUCTION IN KOREA AND JAPAN, 1938
Korea Japan
Agriculture 1+6 16.1$
Forestry 5*5 2.2
Fishing 4.B 1.6
Mining 5»5 3*4
Industry 37. £ 76.7
TOTAL 100 100 ’
Source: Grajdanzev, Andrew J., Modern Korea, {The John
Day Company, 1944)* p« £4.
7
consumption available to Korea remained almost constant in
spite of a 50 percent increase in population during the
6period 1915-1944. Table II, page 8, shows that net 
exports of rice to Japan increased continuously.
A comparison of per capita consumption of rice in 
Korea, Table III, page 9, with the amount of its exports 
to Japan, Table II, indicates the strong impact of the 
Japanese colonial policy. For instance, per capita domestic 
consumption of rice in the four-year period 1930-1933 was 
37 percent lower than that in the years 1915-1919. But, the 
percentage of the rice crop exported had increased to above 
43 percent in the same period.
The Japanese colonial policy caused the Korean 
peasantry to become poorer year by year, as shown in Table 
IV, page 10. This table shows that the percentage of land­
owners decreased continuously, while other tenants increased
rapidly year by year. "Other tenants” included lower scale
7tenants, fire-field farmers (Kadenmin), and agriculture 
laborers. The area of ”fire-fields" was estimated at 
202,15& chongbo (1 chongbo equals 2,4506 acres) in 1932,
^Lee, op. cit., pp. 139-42.
^"Kadenmin” means "fire-field farmers who have no 
land of their own, but cultivate waste land owned by the 
government or private owners. They lead a wandering life.
8
TABLE II
PRODUCTION, EXPORTS, AND DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION 
OF BROWN RICE IN KOREA, 1915-1944
(In millions of U. S. dollars)
Period
Average annual 
production
Net
Exports
Available
Supplies
Population
(Million)
1915-19 4,546 626 3,920 17.1
1920-24 4,675 1*133 3,537 13.6
1925-29 5,094 1,614 3,430 20.4
1930-34 5,694 2,694 2,734 22.1
1935-39 5,694 2,294 3,400 23.3
1940-44 6,246 2,396 3,650 25.1
Source; Lee, J. H., A Handbook of Korea, (Seoul; Office 
of Public Information, Republic of Korea, 1955). pp. 141- 
42. This table is an abridged copy.
9
TABLE III
PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF RICE IN KOREA
(In kokuo)
Average for Amount Index
1915-1919 <>707 100
1920-1924 .638 90
1925-1929 .512 72
1930-1933 .449 63
1934-1938 .396 56
Source: Grajdanzev, A. J., Modern Korea. (N. Y«:
John Day Company, 1944). p. 118.
The
10
TABLE IV
FARM FAMILIES IN DIFFERENT RELATIONSHIPS
TO LAND
(Percentages of the total number)
Relationship 1918 1928 1932
Non-farming landlords .6 .7 10 2
Other landlords 2.5 3.1 2.5
Farmer-owners 19-7 18.5 16.6
Owner-tenants 39.5 32.3 25.9
Other tenants 37.7 45.4 53.8
TOTAL 100 100 100
Source: Grajdanzev, Ao 
John Day Company, 1944)
J., Modern Korea, (N
0 P 0 108 e
The
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366,601 chongbo in 1933, and 442,045 chongbo in 193 
The more powerless families were pushed out to Manchuria 
which was the new colonial area of Japan after 1932.
Japanese colonial controls of land in Korea were 
systematically pursued through the Central Bank, the Bank 
of Chosen, and the Oriental Development Company (largest 
landowner in Korea) under the supervision of the Overseas 
Ministry of the Japanese government. With the approach of 
the end of World War II, Korean farmers were forced to 
follow na delivery system of rice crop” at the official 
price, and to receive the selling price of it several months 
later.
Household industry was a significant part of Korean
economic life. "As late as 193S, household industry was
responsible for 21.9 percent of the total value of production
in the textile industry; 15.6 percent in machinery and tools,
gand 26.5 percent in ceramics." Yet, this kind of household
industry could exist only where the farmers could obtain
10raw materials cheaply and remain free from monopoly.
Household industry was carried on only by Koreans and their 
situation underwent no improvement even by war conditions 
after 1937 (Sino*.Japanese War, 1937-1945)*^ When the
B • _ . _opc * !P0 ltf-2©
^Ibid., pp. 170-71.
1QIbid.
"^Grajdanzev, on. cit.. p. 21.
12
Japanese industry came into this area and began to require
the materials, the Japanese authorities began to restrict
household industry. Then the law and the polic powers
were increasingly employed to restrict the use of raw 12
materials. As Grajdanzev said in 1944, it was true that 
”a complete return to a natural economy is impossible be­
cause home spinning and weaving are being destroyed by the 
Government system of compulsory sales and the destruction
of looms, and because the burden of taxes and duties on such
13enterprises is increasing.”
As a rule Koreans had to pay 25 percent higher
14interest rates than the Japanese. Outputs in industries,
for example, silk and cotton products, were required to be
sold to Japanese agents at depressed prices and to be
15exported to Japan. Korea*s merchandise imports during
the period 1910-1939 exceeded exports by the amount of 1,S8S
million yen, and the net exports of gold from Korea to Japan
16
amounted to 434»2 million yen in the same period.
Grajdanzev has described the Japanese colonial rule in Korea 
by saying that "there are few countries in the world, even
^2Lee, op. cit•, p. 173.
^Grajdanzev, op. cit. . p. 121.
^"^McCune, op. cit. , p. 34*
15Lee, op. cit., p. 172.16Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 236.
13
among the colonies, where such a large portion of the good
17
(sic.) is taken out of the country.” After all, only
an agricultural pattern was important to the Japanese
economy and an industrial pattern was necessary to comple- 
'18 
ment it.
Table V, page 14, indicates some results of the 
Japanese colonial policy in Korea. It shows that technicians 
and engineers constituted only .3 of 1 percent of the total 
Korean workers in industry, while more than 32 percent of 
Japanese workers in Korean industry were technicians and 
engineers. Under the Japanese colonial policy, few Koreans 
were trained in school and prepared to obtained responsible 
positions or wealth. Little effort was made to prepare 
them for technical or managerial positions.
Furthermore, a good deal of heavy industry established 
by the Japanese and mainly located in northern Korea, pro­
duced military supplies and consequently did not serve the 
Korean economy itself. Forestry and fishery, power and 
mineral resources, transport and communication, banking 
and financing, and the external trade of Korea were basically
directed to serve the Japanese military establishment,
19especially during the years of World War II. As a result,
17Ibid.18
Lee, o£. cit., p. 172.
19Grajdanzev, o£. cit., pp. 123-248.
14 
TABLE V
EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS FOR KOREA, 1943
WORKERS
Category Total Koreans Japanese Others
Industry 549,751 512,907 26,966 9,373
Mining 133,353 173,331 1.935 2,542
Transportation 35,539 SO,123 4,791 670
Business 24,419 20,545 3,675 199
TECHNICIANS AND ENGINEERS
Industry 9,352 1,359 7,993
Mining 3,463 1,323 2,145
Transportation 1,125 122 1,003
Business 3,934 2,591 1,343
Source: McCuen, G. M.. Korea Today, ( N o  Y«s Harvard
University Press, 1950)o Table 7. Industrial Employment 
Statistics for all Korea, 1943, pp« 332-33. This table is 
an abridged copy of one appearing there.
15
the Korean economy relied mostly on the Japanese economy
for capital goods, and was also dependent on Japanese
industry for many consumer goods*
In other words, the basic resources were depleted
by the Japanese. The farmers were mobilized into munitions
factories and land was over-planted. Forests were overcut
for warships and minerals were intensively mined. Industrial20
plants deteriorated with heavy use and no replacement.
War inflation took place, and Koreans suffered discrimination 
and social-economic pressure on every hand. The self- 
interested Japanese colonial policy was manifested directly 
or indirectly in all economic activities.
However, that the Japanese contributed to the Korean 
economy cannot be denied. The Japanese built a good north- 
south railway, modern port facilities, highways, communica­
tions, an extensive postal system, and many government and 
commercial buildings. They established heavy industry to 
promote modernization using coal and hydroelectric power in 
the north part of Korea, and such lighter^industries as 
textiles, rubber, and chemicals in the south. A modern
banking and financial system was well developed over the 21
peninsula. A feudalistic Korean society was rapidly
20Lee, op. cit. , p. 172.21Lewis, John P., Reconstruction and Development in 
South Korea (Wash., D. C.l National Planning Association, 
1955). p. 9.
changed to a modern society, and the population grew swiftly 
with increasing agricultural productivity, expanding fisher­
ies, and industrialization of the economy. The Japanese 
occupation virtually made the Korean economy the most 
advanced on the Asian mainland by 1945.
The Japanese achievement in the Korean economy, was, 
however, of little benefit to the Koreans. The development 
was undertaken only because of the necessity to complement
the Japanese economy, that is, to take maximum advantage of
22
its colonial position in the Korean peninsula. Nor is it 
necessary to think that the industrialization of the Korean 
economy was owed only to the Japanese role. After liberation 
from the Japanese occupation in 1945, Korears economy was 
further advanced, despite the difficult circumstances, as 
shown in the succeeding chapters.
In summary, the effects of Japanese occupation were 
both beneficial and detrimental to Korean economic develop­
ment. The Japanese advanced the economy from the feudalistic 
to the modern stage. However, they invested only the capital
up to the point where it could complement the Japanese grow-
23ing economy during those days. The Japanese economic 
pressure in its development, preparation for war, and later
22McCune, o£. cit., p. 30.
23
17
the war itself, led beyond the limits of economically 
sound production for the natural resources in Korea.
Koreans generally believe that they would have been able to 
develop their economy to a highly advanced stage without the 
pressence of Japanese colonialism.,
Bo THE KOREAN ECONOMY SINCE 1945
With liberation from the Japanese mile in 1945, the 
Korean economy felt the full impact of its creation by the 
Japanese militarism and its development solely as a supple­
ment to the Japanese economye Furthermore, the tremendous 
task of redirecting and reconstructing the economy was 
complicated by the international struggle over the newly 
independent nation* The Korean peninsula was divided in 
1945 at the 3&th parallel and Russian and American troops 
occupied the northern and southern parts respectively,,
Since then no communication between these two parts has taken 
24place* Three years later, two Koreas were born on this 
tiny peninsula. Two years later, the limited accomplish­
ments of rebuilding were destroyed by the devastating civil 
war which was waged over almost the whole of Korea, and which 
ended without solving the basic problem of unification of 
Korea.
24Cf. Introduction, p. 1*
i d
Liberation and Political Division of Korea* The 
international situation and conflicting idealogies of rival 
powers have resulted in disappointment of the great expecta­
tions of the Korean liberation in 1945* Expectations of a 
declaration at the Cairo conference in 1943 that "in due 
course Korea shall be free and independent" and the reaf­
firmation of this promise at the Potsdam conference in 1945 
were not realized. The division at the 3&th parallel by the 
United States and the Soviet Union cut the Korean peninsula 
along its center and has been a fatal blow to the entire 
Korean economy.
Before liberation from the Japanese, Korears inter­
national position was already established. The so-called
Provisional Government of Korea had been maintained in China 
25since 1919° With the approach of the end of World War II,
the Korean independence movements in China, the Soviet Union,
and the United States had become particularly active. In
March of 1942, Koreans, mainly those residing in the United
States, assembled to have a Liberty Conference in Washington
for the purpose of obtaining diplomatic action on behalf of 26
Korea. Though these efforts gained only an expression of 
sympathy, they influenced later discussion of Korea by the
25McCune, op. cit., p. 41°26
Ibid., p. 42.
19 27
members of the Pacific War Council in Washington.
The Cairo declaration concerning Korea in 1943 was
that ’’the aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the
enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in
due course Korea shall become free and independent.” After
the San Francisco meeting of the United Nations in 1945,
the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that a short-
term trusteeship by four powers (the United States, the
Soviet Union, the United Kongdom, and China) would be the
23
best preliminary step toward Korean independence. Before
this agreement could be implemented, however, separation of
the Korean peninsula into two militarily occupied zones had
taken place. Russian troops moved into northern Korea in
29September of 1945o
In December, 1945, the Moscow Foreign Ministers Con­
ference concluded an agreement that a Joint Commission be 
formed by the American and Soviet occupation forces for the
purpose of setting up a provisional government for the whole 
30
of Korea. Eventually the efforts of the Joint Commission 
proved unsuccessful. The southern zone was formed into the
27ibid.
2 3Lee, op. cit., pp. 43-44. 
29Ibid., p. 61.
3°Ibid.
20
Republic of Korea on August 15, 194$, by the resolution of
the United Nations General Assembly, and was recognized by
the United States, the United Kingdom, China and Canada
31early in 1949. On the other hand, the Korean PeopleTs
Republic came into being one month later in the Russian zone,
and has since been recognized by the Soviet Union, the
Peopled Republic of China, and the eastern European coun- 
32
tries. The divergency between the two sides become deeper 
and deeper with the passing of time*
Thus, Korea has become a burning point in present 
Asian politics, with two opposing governments existing on 
the tiny peninsula. The division at the 3$th parallel, 
which was originally proposed "to provide a convenient allo­
cation of responsibility for the acceptance of the Japanese 
33surrender," seemed to herald the tragedy of the Korean War
five years later. The war resulted not only in making more
difficult the unification of Korea, but also in total damage
34of about $3 billion over the peninsula. The Korean 
economy rushed into destruction with no chance to rebuild 
itself from the suffering caused by the forty years of
-^Bird, E. M . . Asian Annual 1956, (London: Eastern
World, 1956). p. 63.
32Ibid.
^3Truman, Harry S., Year of Decision, Vol. I, (N. Y.: 
Doubleday and Company, 1955). p. 522.
34The Bank of Korea, ojd. cit., I, 181.
21
Japanese colonialism. Koreans now wonder if liberation of 
194-5 was indeed an emancipation, or if it was only a 
substitution of other foreign powers for the Japanese.
As long as the Korean problem remained linked with 
the deteriorating relations between the United States and 
the Soviet Union, the separation has continued and Korea 
has been divided despite the homogeneous background of 
history9 culture, and the economy. Thus, the basic Korean 
problem could not be expected to resolve itself satisfactorily. 
But the division is a fait accompli.
35The Korean War and its Aftermath. The greater part;
of the Korean territory was fought over two or three times
during the war. Many villages and cities, especially some
industrial areas, were destroyed by heavy American bombing.
More than a million persons died by gunfire, starvation, and
36
cold in southern Korea alone. In 1951, "probably close to
half of all south Koreans fell into some refugee or relief 
37category.” Besides, 1.5 million refugees may have come
33from northern Korea during the war.
3^This description of the effects of the War concerns 
the Republic of Korea (southern Korea), because no informa­
tion is available about northern Korea.
^^Lewis, 0£. cit., p. 16.
37Ibid.
33United Nations, Economic Survey of Asia and the Far 
East, 1955, (N.Y.; Department of Economic Affairs,' 19561. p. 141.
22
Between 1945 and 1950, the population jumped to over
20 millions, a 25 percent increase, including about one
million repatriates from Japan and 1.5 million northern
Korean refugees. The estimated population of south Korea
was approximately 22 million in September of 1955 The
pressure of unusual increases in population has been a
serious problem to the economy.
During the Second World War, the Korean peninsula had
escaped damages, but all Korea suffered losses of about $3
billion by this new war. For southern Korea alone, an
official estimate puts the total property damage at about
39f>l,$00 million. "Perhaps a third of south KoreaTs housing
units and substantial proportions of its schools, other
public buildings, roads, and bridges were either destroyed 
40
or damaged." Damages to industrial facilities alone are
estimated at $354 million, including "43$ of all industrial
facilities, 41$ of all power-generating installations, and
4150$ of all coal-raining facilities."
Moreover, most productive enterprises were disrupted 
by the movement of armies and refugees, and became stagnant 
because of raw material or electric power shortages. Man­
power was mobilized into the army from the agricultural dis-
^ T h e  Bank of Korea, og. cit. , I, lSl.
40Lewis, 0£. cit., p. 16.
^United Nations. Department of Economic Affairs, 
op. cit., p. 140.
23
triots, and farm production decreased. A large portion of 
the labor force was unemployed, and many died. The govern­
ment budget was alloted heavily toward military defenses. 
Table VI, page 2.4, shows the dramatic reduction in output for 
selected commodities as a result of the war.
The increase of paper money issue and comparatively 
lower transactions owing to bitter wartime shortages led 
the price level up without stopping, despite a vigorous 
stabilization effort by concerned authorities. From 1950 to 
1953 wholesale prices rose fifteen times and retail prices
twenty times. The accumulated price level increased 10,000
42
fold from 1945 to 1953«
Foreign Aid. Assuming that the problem of division
of the Korean peninsula at the 33th parallel will not be
solved for some time in the future, foreign aid seems to be
a necessity for growth and development of the economy under
the present circumstances. With stationing of the American
Army in Korea, foreign aid was provided to Korea from funds
of Government and Relief in Occupation Areas appropriations,
which were for relief items - food, clothing, fertilizer,
and petroleum - but nothing was done to improve the poor
43industrial facilities. By 1949* the Economic Cooperation
^2Lewis, ag. cit., pp. 17-13.
43Brown, William A., Jr., American Foreign Assistance. 
(Washington, D. C.s The Brookings Institution, 1953)« p« 373•
24
TABLE VI
WARTIME CHANGES IN SOUTH KOREA*S 
PRODUCTION OF SELECTED COMMODITIES
(1945 - 100)
1950 1951 1952
Staple foods (rice, other grains; 
pulses, and potatoes ...........
Cotton sheeting 
Common brick
96 73 65
73 92 39
53 10 54
35 57 67
74 53 S2
34 26 66
Source: Lewis, John P., Reconstruction and Development in
South Korea (Washington, D. C.: National Planning Associ­
ation, 1955), p» 17.
25
Administration program was established for building a self-
supporting Korean economy, but, owing to the Korean War, it
was in vain. With the war, the Civil Relief in Korea and
the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency for long-
run plans to reconstruct the economy, were established
simultaneously in 1950 by resolution of the United Nations
44General Assembly.
These agencies have made significant contributions to 
the stabilization of the price level and rebuilding of basic 
industry in Korea under difficult circumstances. A more 
detailed treatment of foreign aid to Korea will be given in 
the succeeding chapters.
44The Bank of Korea, 0£. cit.» I, 181.
CHAPTER II
PROBLEMS OF THE KOREAN ECONOMY
The Korean economy has been doubly handicapped since 
World War II, even neglecting the aftermath of Japanese 
colonialism. One handicap was the separation of the economy 
along the 3#th parallel and another the military occupation 
by foreign troops. These things predestined the tragic war, 
and they continue to make a solution of Korea’s economic 
problems extremely difficult.
A. PATTERN OF THE KOREAN ECONOMY
Zonal Division of the Economy. During the 36 years 
of the Japanese colonial rule in Korea, the Japanese economic 
development of Korea was never considered to be for the 
Korean national economy as a whole. But, for their own 
purposes, the Japanese had contributed substantially to the 
economic development of Korea and carried out the rationali­
zation of its industry.
The uneven distribution of economic resources between 
north and south of the peninsula, however, had made each 
region complementary to the other. The utilization of this 
complementary situation was completely prevented by the 
division of Korea at the 38th parallel. Factories were
26
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located in one zone, but a part of facilities in the other.
The larger part of the mineral resources was in the northern
area with the heavy industry, while agriculture and light
1
industry was concentrated in south Korea. As long as there
was no means of exchanging the raw materials for consumer
goods produced in the south, the abundant mineral resources
and heavy industry of the northern part of Korea were almost
2
useless to the northern Koreans. On the other hand, the
southern part of Korea had many light manufacturing plants
3which required raw materials from northern Korea. For
example, the fanner needs fertilizer and factories need
4electric power from north Korea.
Table VII, page 2# shows that the southern area had 
three times as much cultivated paddy acreage as the northern 
area.
This contrast between two zones reflects geographical 
features and differences in land utilization. As shown in 
the table, southern Korea was mostly a rice-cultivating area 
and northern Korea a dry-field region.
Industrial characteristics of the two zones are shown 
in Table VIII, page 29*
McCune, George M., Korea Today, (N. Y.: Harvard
University Press, 1950), pp. 52-60.
2Ibid., p. 54.
3Ibid.. pp. 54-55*
4Ibid., p. 55.
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TABLE VII
CULTIVATED AREA IN NORTHERN AND 
SOUTHERN KOREA, 1944
(ACRES)
Paddy Dry field 
Southern zone 3,072,300 2,695,000
Northern zone 1,097,600 5,343,450
Total
5,767,300
6,441,050
Source; McCune, George M., Korea Today, (N.-Y.: Harvard
University Press, 1950), p. 53*
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TABLE VIII
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, 
NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN KOREA, 1940
(All Korea = 100 percent)
Goods South North
Heavy I n d u s t r y .......... . . . . . 14% S6
Chemicals .........  . . . . . .  12 SB
Metals .................. . . . 15 &5
Ceramic (Including cement) . . .  30 70
Gas and Electric . . . . . . . .  15 B5
Light Industry  .................  74 25
Textiles ........................ B6 14
Machines  ........  70 30
Lumber . . . . . . . . . . . .  70 30
F o o d   65 3 5
Printing . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 0  10
Miscellaneous . . . . . . . . . 7 6  24
Source: McCune, George M., Korea Today, (N. Y.: Harvard
University Press, 1950), p. 57« This table is an abridged 
copy of the one appearing there.
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Table VIII shows that southern Korea is significant 
in the output of light manufacturing products for the whole 
economy (74 percent), while northern Korea is predominant 
as the center of heavy industry (86 percent).
The mining industry presents another contrast, as 
shown in Table IX, page 31* Some minerals are found princi­
pally in northern Korea and others in southern Korea. Par­
ticularly significant is the fact that northern Korea posses­
ses the lion’s share of those minerals which count for most 
in an industrial economy, namely, coal, iron ore, lead, lime­
stone, nickel, pyrite, titanium, and zinc. The south has 
nearly one half of the tungsten, a vital mineral in the 
steel industry. The peninsula’s richness in mineral 
resources, composed of over 300 different sorts of mineral
ore, deserves special attention. The deposit of tungsten
5in all Korea is the sixth largest in the world.
B. THE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
During World War II Korea suffered a great deal in­
directly. Many young Koreans were pressed into Japanese labor 
mobilization and the economic losses were substantial. Indus­
try pushed production beyond its capacity, farmers suffered 
from low selling prices of "a delivery system of rice crop,*’
5Bird, E. M., Asian Annual 1957, (London: Eastern
World, 1957), p® 67®
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TABLE II
PERCENTAGES OF SELECTED MINERALS, NORTHERN 
AND SOUTHERN KOREA, 1944
(All Korea ■ 100 percent)
Minerals South North
Alunite 100 —
Apatite 100
Asbestos 95 5
Barite 75 25
Coal 21 79
Cobalt . 100 —
Copper 55 45
Gold 37 63
Graphite 44 56
Iron Ore 3 97
Lead 43 57
Limestone 2 9$
Magnesite — 100
Mica 10 90
Nickel 29 71
Pyrite — 100
Titanium 5 95
Tungsten 54 46
Zinc 25 75
Source: McCune, George M . , Korea Today, (No Y.:
University Press, 1950), p. 5&«
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and forests were laid bare by excessive cutting. The 
weakened economy became worse with the separation at the 38th 
parallel* Business in southern Korea suddenly lost its export 
market and essential raw materials. Even worse, the estab­
lishment of two governments in the tiny land led to virtual 
stagnation of the economy. After liberation, southern Korea 
was thrown into temporary political chaos. Normal economic 
activities ceased and inflation reached serious proportions. 
Fortunately, foreign aid and government efforts made a 
significant contribution to the economy, even during the 
war.
Gross National Product. Owing to social confusion 
after 1945, gross national product estimates were not avail­
able until the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency6
published these statistics in 1953» The gross national
product during the period 1949-50 was about $1.75 billion
7and per capita income was about $92 per year. National
B
income was supplemented by $110 million foreign aid.
As shown in Table X, gross national product declined 
dramatically from $1 ,7 7 0 million to $1,384 million during the 
war and net imports increased three times by the period,
^Lewis, John P., Reconstruction and Development in 
South Korea, (Washington, D. C.s National Planning Associa- 
tion, 1955 J, p. 15.
7Ibid.
^Ibid.
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TABLE X
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT AND NET IMPORTS, 
ORIGIN AND USES OF TOTAL RESOURCES, 
SELECTED TEARS
(In millions
Items
of U. S. 
1949-50
dollars)
1952-53 1953-5
Gross national product
by industrial origin o . . , 1,770 1,334 1 ,721
Agriculture and forestry . 374 64 765Fisheries . . e . * . . . 65 56 53
Mining o e e o o o o o o 15 17 23Manufacturing . • . . e . 132 146 139
Construction . • o . . « 43 16 42
Wholesale and retail trade 133 96 139
Services, foreign tradeo . 
and finance . . . . . • 233 175 231Transportation and public 
utilities o e . . . » . 32 41 45
Government . . . . « . o 130 156 139
Service to U.N. Command • — 40 40
Net import 110 160 451
Total available resources. . 1,330 1,544 ' 2,172
Personal consumption . . . 1,440 1,069 1 ,325
Gross domestic investment 170 75 197
Government service . . . 270 400 650
Source; Lewis, John P., Reconstruction and Development 
in South Korea, (Washington, Do C.; National Planning 
Association, 1955), p° 13•
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1953-1954* Government service was successively increased,
while domestic investment was drastically reduced. This
table reveals a basic need for more production, more private
and public capital facilities, and more exports.
The shortage of gross national product relative to
gross national expenditure was filled by foreign aid
averaging 10 percent of gross national product, as depicted
in Table XI, page 35*
Even with foreign aid, per capita income was only
about $92 per year. This may be compared with $100 in
9Japan, $57 in India, and $36 in Burma.
Government Budget. In Table XII, page 36, the 
proportion of foreign aid to total government revenues in 
1955 was very large, amounting to 44*3 percent.
Among expenditures, those for national defense were 
38.3 percent and for reconstruction only 21.5 percent. The 
amount of foreign aid (44*3 percent) was nearly matched by 
national defense expenditure (3^.3 percent).
The Balance of Payments. It is characteristic of 
the Korean balance of payments that the scale of foreign 
trade is small and supplemented by foreign aid. Table XIII, 
page 3S, shows Korea as an immature debtor nation. Commodity 
imports, mainly consumer goods, exceeded commodity exports.
9Ibid., p. 14*
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TABLE XI
RELATION OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, EXPENDITURE,
AND FOREIGN AID, 1954-1956
(In billion hwan)
Gross National Gross National 
Year  Product Expenditure Foreign Aid
1954 659o9 72S.3 63.4
1955 1,042.3 1,139.9 97.6
1956 1,269.0 1,427.3 153.3
Source: The Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Review 1957,
(Korea: The Research Department, Bank of Korea, 1957),
I, 179.
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TABLE XII
STATUS OF REPUBLIC OF KOREA GOVERNMENT BUDGET, 1955
(In millions of hwan)
Items Total
Revenues;
Taxes 111,156
Foreign aid (counterpart funds)a 133,404
Other*3 66,735
TOTAL 301,296
Percentage
Distribution
36o91o 
44.3 
18.8
100
Expenditures;
General account 
National defense 
Reconstruction 
Other°
TOTAL
96,939
115,727
65,101
24,389
302,154
32.1
38.3
21.5
8.1
100
Counterpart funds compose refunds from ICA, UNKRA 
and other sources.
Composed of receipts from government enterprises 
and properties, other revenues, national bonds, and special 
accounts.
Composed of national bonds and special accounts.
Source: The Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Review 1957,
(Korea: The Research Department, Bank of Korea, 1958)",
I, 18-19.
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The excess of exports was supplemented by extensive foreign 
aid, mainly from the United States# This.phenomenon 
precipitated the controversy in setting up the exchange 
rate between the dollar and the hwan, the Korean monetary 
unit, which will be treated below under exchange rate#
In respect to Koreafs balance of payments, the table 
on the following page shows that on 1955, debits exceed the 
credits by $266,4^3 thousand, that is, the difference 
between debits of $354»&&7 thousand and credits of only 
$66,404 thousand# But, the small amount of credit is 
supplemented by $272,649 thousand of donations, as shown in 
item II of the same table#
C. INFLATION
The inflationary tendency in Korea is severe and 
constitutes a basic problem# This tendency was inherited 
from the Japanese colonial economy# In 1939 the money 
supply was 30 million yen but it increased to 1.6 billion 
yen in 1944 and to 6 billion yen on August 31, 1945# Cur­
rency issue was suddenly increased by the Japanese adminis-10
tration during the month of August, 1945« The shortage of 
raw materials, the crippled industry, scarcity of consumer 
goods, and the desperate Japanese administration during the
■^Lee, J# H#, A Handbook of Korea, (Seoul: Office 
of Public Information, Republic of Korea, 1955), p<> 247#
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TABLE XIII
ABBREVIATED KOREAN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1955
(Thousands of U. S
Items
T
. dollars) 
Credit Debit
JL 6
A. Current account 165,604 $344,433
1. Merchandise 17,602 327,3252. Travel 352 1,6333. Non-monetary gold 
movement 114
A. Transportation and 
insurance 763 423
5. Investment income 1,646 __
6. Government transactions 43,#40 13,097
7. Miscellaneous 1,232 1,455
B. Capital and Monetary Gold — 10,399
Co Net Errors and Ommission BOO —
TOTAL $66,404 $354,337
II. Donations (foreign aid)* 272,349 4,364
NET TOTAL $339,253 $359,251
*The items of donations include private gifts.
Source: The Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Review 1957»
(Korea: The Research Department, Bank of Korea, 1957),
IV, 211-12. This table is abridged.
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last stage of the Second World War contributed to the infla­
tionary pressures in the Korean economy. Furthermore, this
tendency was exaggerated and became "a chronic social con- 11
dition” by the administrative vacuum - rampancy of brokers
(monopolists of consumer goods), the increasing flood of
currency, the general shut-down of production in 1945 and a
decreased production during the years of 1945-1948, and
finally, the Korean war of 1950-1953®
During the two or three months before the Japanese12
surrender, the price level increased 20 to 25 times. From
1945 to 1950, retail prices rose 25 times and wholesale 
 12
prices 29 times. From 1950 to 1953 retail prices increased
1320-fold and wholesale prices more than 15-fold. Conse- .
quently, the accumulated price level increased by 10,000-fold
14during the period 1945-1950.
At last, a currency revaluation was carried out in
1953 and about 8 percent of the money supply outstanding was
frozen as of June 30. This was more than offset by the
increase of 23 percent in the total money supply from the
15end of 1952 to June 30, 1953® By the currency revaluation
Lewis, 0£. cit. , p. 17® 
12Ibid.
13Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
^^Ibid.
^Lee, o£. cit., p. 251®
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the government was aided in the collection of back taxes
through reducing the money supply for transactions, and
16
restoring the people’s confidence in the currency.
Table XIV, page 41, shows relations of money supply
and principal influences upon the money supply during the
period 1945-1953•
As shown in the table, the government overdrafts
at the Bank of Korea had a tremendous impact upon the total
money supply, and the expansion of bank credit to other
borrowers was also significant. In this connection, the
successively increasing advances of local currency to the
United Nations Command was in considerable degree responsible
for the serious inflation during the first two years of the 
17war. Besides, the intensified shortages of all goods and
services, decreased production, and over-population during
16
the war must be remembered.
The inflationary tendency, however, has been moder­
ated with the establishment of the single exchange rate 
between dollars and hwan in 1955o This is treated in the 
following section.
16Ibid., pp. 243-249* 
17Ibid.
Ibid.
TABLE XIV
MONEY SUPPLY AND PRINCIPAL FACTORS AFFECTING 
THE MONEY SUPPLY, 1945-1953
(In million hwan)
Items 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953
Money Supplya 114.3 248*5 494.5 696 1,211 2,831 7,304 14,325 30,316Government Overdraft * 8 60*5 169 286 389 2,095 4,306 5,958 11,490Bonds held by Bank of Korea —  - - - 33 13 24 126Bank loans to Gov’t Agency 2.3 40*4 7.5 24 248 111 550 1,380 1,847Bonds held by Other Banks* —  _ — — — — — - 71 215 644Bank loans to Gov’t Agency* _ _ - - — « . . . 246 1,080 2,858
Bank Credit to Public Sector 3.1 100.9 176.5 310 637 2,239 5,201 8,657 16,965Bank Credit to Private Sector 8*8 11.3 12.6 18 38 33 2,269 5,640 16,009B. 0. K* loans to Private
Borrowers* 8.8 11.3 12.6 18 38 33 267 229 732Other Banks Loans to Private
Borrowers 2,002 5,411 15,277B. 0, K. Purchases of foreign
exchange* -— -— «*• mm — 7 71 122 1,264
Savings and Time Deposits* 18.1 30.2 41 60 55 127 273 2,325Deposits of foreign organizations* — — «MB Wm — 61 94 23 323
Other Deposits0 102*4 154.4 335.6 409 596 668 -16 262 -1,154
•p-H
aMoney supply consists of Bank of Korea notes and monetary deposits*
^With the exclusion of the Korean Reconstruction Bank from the coverage of banking 
institutions its deposits with the Bank of Korea have been included in "other” and so 
the figures of "other” have been revised*
*In these items the data indicated by dashes were not available.
Source; The Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Review, 1957, (Korea; The Research Depart­
ment, Bank of Korea, 1957), IV, 16*
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D. EXCHANGE RATE
The exchange ratio between United States dollars and
the Korean hwan has played an important role in the Korean
economy. As mentioned previously, Korea received foreign
aid amounting to about $1,435 million during the period from
1945 to 1955* Money supply in Korea has steadily increased
from year to year, as mentioned in Section C, As a result,
the price level has risen and exchange rates have been
changed by the Korean government seven times during the
period from 1945 to 1955° Besides, there have been at least
five different exchange rates of hwan to U. S, dollars during
the same decade. Official exchange rates and the five kinds
of it from 1945 to 1955 are given in Table XV, page 43®
As the Korean price level rose, it was inevitable that
Korea would try to keep the lowest possible exchange rate
for foreign aid goods and services in order to hold down the
hwan prices of American products. For example, the total
foreign economic aid to Korea in 1955 was about $244 thou- 
19sand, under the exchange rate of 500 hwan to one dollar. 
Suppose that the exchange rate had been changed from 500 to 
1,000 hwan for one dollar. Then $244 thousand worth of 
foreign economic aid would buy for Korea only half as much 
foreign products. This is why the establishment of "the
19The Bank of Korea, op. cit., IV, 221.
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TABLE XV
EXCHANGE RATES OF HWAN TO U.S. DOLLARS, 1945-1955 
(Rates of hwan to one U.S. dollar)
U.N. Finance
Office Rate_______
Weighted 
average of 
Counter- To other U.S. Army-
Effective Official part Fund transac- dollar*s
Year Rate Rate To G.I. tions auctions
1945 -5 -- -- ——
1943 4.5 — — — —
1949 9 4.5 — -- —
1950 IS 14 25 25 —
1951 60 60 60 60 —
1953 ISO ISO ISO 170 25S
1955 500 500 500 500 ■ 729
Note: U. N. hwan advances were repaid at the various
rates from May, 1954 to August, 1955« Detailed information 
is available in this source.
Source: The Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Review 1957»
(Korea: The Research Department, Bank of Korea, 1957)7
IV, £5.
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single exchange rate” between dollars and hwan in 1955 has
been conditioned by the American government’s limitation
that the price level be sustained within 25 percent annually,
20
otherwise economic aid will be suspended.
On the other hand, U.N. forces’ hwan advances were
21
about 12,000 million hwan in 1955* If the exchange rate
climbs from 500 to 1,000 hwan for one dollar, the Korean
government will receive only -$12 million instead of $24 million*
Furthermore, the actual transactions in Korea are taken over
in terms of Korean currency to foreign agencies and firms,
no matter what the black market ratio may be* Thus, foreign
agencies will suffer from this official rate - maybe the
black market rate being double - and cancel some contrasts*
Eventually, reconstruction programs will be delayed by
unwillingness of foreign agencies.
With foreign economic aid being about $97 million more
22
in 1955. than in 1954, the establishment of the single ex­
change rate and the government’s retrenchment in financial 
policy have contributed greatly to deterring the inflationary 
tendency.
20Ibido, I, 1. 
21Ibid., IV, 123. 
22Ibid*. 221.
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E. RECONSTRUCTION
As developed in the previous sections of this chapter, 
the Korean economy, owing to unbalanced resources and 
political influences, could not develop in a normal way. Re­
construction programs, however, have been worked out for the 
purpose of rebuilding basic industries with assistance from 
such programs as the International Cooperation Administration 
and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency. The 
Korean government is also endeavoring to rebuild its economy. 
As a result, a significant amount of reconstruction has 
already been accomplished in industrial facilities, mining, 
irrigation, housing, and fertilizer factories. Gross 
national product and per capita income made moderate increases 
during the period 1953 to 1955» (Table XVI, page 46).
The table shows about a 10 percent annual rate of 
increase in gross national product and improvement of per 
capita income. With the exception of war-time booms, this 
rate of increase was experienced by few advanced countries.
Since 1953» the government retrenchment policy and 
effective foreign economic aid have greatly contributed to 
the rehabilitation and stabilization of the economy. Details 
concerning this aid to Korea will be given in the following 
chapter.
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TABLE XVI
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT AND 
PER CAPITA INCOME
Income 1953 1954 1955
Gross national product
in million hwan 432,409 529,435 563,317
Index 100 109-S 119*3
Total population in
thousands 20,344 21,173 21,526
Index 100 101 . 6 103.3
Per capita income
in hwan 23,127 25,000 26,169
Index 100 107.1 113.2
Notes The figures are estimates by the Bank of 
Korea with consideration given to inflation during the 
period 1953-1955.
Source: The Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Review 1957.
(Korea: The Research Department, Bank of Korea, 1957),
I, 175.
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CHAPTER III
FOREIGN AID TO KOREA
The foreign economic aid programs to Korea have been 
largely the response of the United States foreign assistance
programs as ninety percent of foreign aid to Korea has come
1
from the United States® A brief review of American foreign 
aid policy will be necessary to understand the full situa­
tion of foreign aid to Korea®
A. A GENERAL REVIEW OF AMERICAN FOREIGN AID
From the Second World War to 1955* the United States
contributed about $52 billion in all kinds of foreign aid
2
to many countries® Much of this went to Western Europe to
help the recovery of war-damaged areas and to check the
3communist expansion® Even though the amount of foreign aid 
by the United States is large it represents a comparatively 
small proportion of its annual gross national product (see 
Table XVII, page 4#)® For instance, beginning in 1950 less 
than two percent of the country’s national product has been 
given each year in foreign assistance® In this connection,
"̂See Introduction®
2The Brookings Institution, Administrative Aspects of 
United States Foreign Assistance Programs, Committee Print, 
85 Cong® 1 Sess®, p. 4®
3Ibid.
4$
TABLE XVII
UNITED STATES GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, 
TOTAL FEDERAL EXPENDITURE FOR GOODS 
SERVICES, AND FOREIGN AID
(In billion dollars)
Federal expenditure for
goods and services________
Total foreign 
Gross Foreign Aid Expenditures aid as % of
national gross national
Year product Total Total Military Economic product____
1946 209.2 23.6 5.04 0 0 4.97 2.4
1947 232.2 20.5 6.61 . 04 6.57 2.9
194^ 257.3 22 5.22 .03 4.92 JO « O
1949 257.3 26.1 5.36 .21 5.65 2.3
1950 2S5 22.3 4.17 .53 3.64 1.5
1951 32S.2 41.2 4.66 1.47 3.19 1.4
1952 345.4 54.7 4.9^ 2.60 2.3 d 1.4
1953 363.2 59.7 6.31 4.25 2.06 1.7
1954 360.7 4S e S 4.72 3.16 1.56 1.3
19 55 390.9 47 4.30 3.13 2.17 1.1
Source; The Brookings Institution, Administrative Aspects 
of United States Foreign Assistance Programs, Committee 
Print, 85 Cong, I Sess., p. 4«
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4Korea received $243*931 thousand of foreign aid in 1955°
This is less than *07 percent of the American gross national 
product.
For analysis purposes foreign aid may be divided into 
four periods:-7 the first period (1945-194&) emphasizes post­
war rehabilitation; the second (194S-1951) is dominated by 
the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), until the 
creation of the Mutual Security Act of 1951; the third 
(1951-1955) by the Foreign Operation Administration (FOA); 
and the fourth period from the establishment of the Inter­
national Cooperation Administration (ICA) in June, 1955* to 
date.
The Mutual Security Act of 1951 marked the turning
point in the administration of foreign aid programs from
6 . economic to defense objectives. By this Act (1951)* the
military and economic aids to foreign countries have been
7integrated into one assistance program.
In brief, the main provisions of the Mutual Security 
Act of 1951 are as follows: It gives "the Director responsi­
bility for continuous supervision, general direction, and
"̂The Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Review 1957» 
(Korea: The Research Department, Bank of Korea, 19577,
I, 1S1.
^The Brookings Institution, o£. cit., p. 5°
6Ibid.
7Ibid
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coordination of the military, economic, and technical
assistance program;" it gives "the Secretary of Defense
primary operating responsibility for the military-assistance
program;" and it gives "the Secretary of State operating
responsibility for the technical cooperation program, for
support of similar programs in certain international
8organizations, and for certain minor activities*"
Since the establishment of the Mutual Security Act 
of 1951, operation of foreign assistance has been divided 
among the Mutual Security Agency which is responsible for 
economic assistance; the Technical Cooperation Administra­
tion for technical cooperation; and the Department of 
Defense for military assistance*
B. HISTORY OF FOREIGN AID TO KOREA
The history of foreign aid to Korea begins with
American foreign assistance. During the period from 1945 
to 1955 > the foreign aid to Korea may be classified into 
three definable periods*
The First Period* Foreign aid to Korea began with 
the gift of relief goods under a separate program of the
Government and Relief in Occupation Area (GARIOA) at the
^Ibid*, p* 10*
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9close of* the Second World War« It was administered by the 
Army of Occupation and provided food, clothing, and ferti­
lizer, with no consideration for the reorganization of the 
Korean economy.^ During the period 1945-1949, #502 million 
worth of goods was donated by GARIOA."^
The Second Period. The second period began with
appropriation of $150 million from the Economic Cooperation
12Administration (ECA) in 1949* In June, 1949, the President
of the United States asked Congress for economic assistance
to Korea in order "to resist and reject Communist propaganda”
for fear that "the Asian people would begin to doubt the
13practical superiority of democratic principles." This 
first attempt of foreign economic program for long-run 
planning of the Korean economy was pursued by the Office of 
Planning of the Korean government with the United States
14Economic Cooperation Administration until April of 1951.
The ECA program has been succeeded by the Foreign Operation
gBrown, W. A., and Opie, R», American Foreign Assis­
tance, (Wash., D. C.s The Brookings institution, 19i>i), p<> 
"3777“ 10Ibid.
■^The Bank of Korea, op. cit., IV, 221.
12Brown, W. A., and Opie, R., op. cit.. p. 373.
13Ibid.. p. 375.
■^United Nations, Economic Survey of Asia and the Far 
East. 1956, (New Yorks Department of Economic Affairs,
1955), p. 141.
52
Administration (FOA) during the period 1951 to 1953 and
later to the International CooDeration Administration 
15(ICA).
By 1955 the total amount of the American economic 16
aid to Korea under these operations was $402,9&7 thousand*
Besides, there was military assistance of $10*97 million
appropriated under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, which
was signed as a bilateral agreement between the Republic
17of Korea and the United States in January of 1950* But, 
owing to the Korean War (1950-1953), the ECA program for 
long-run planning was in vain, though the ICA had made 
significant contributions to the rebuilding of the Korean 
economy*
The Third Period* Having closed down in April of
1951, the ECA functions were transferred to the United
Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), which was in
accordance with the General Assembly resolution of December IB
1, 1950. Prior to this resolution, the Civil Relief in 
Korea aid (CRIK), similar to the GARIOR was adopted by the 
Security Council of the United Nations General Assembly on
■^The Bank of Korea, oj>* cit. , IV, 221. 
16,Ibid,
17Brown, W. A. and Opie, A., ojd. cit*. pp. 3B0-62.
Second Report to Congress on the Mutual Security 
Programs, Washington * D. C*s U» S* Govft Printing Office, 
1952), pp. 33-34.
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19June, 1950. By 1955 UNKRA aid amounted to $73,27620
thousand and CRIK $457,047 thousando Through the ICA,
UNKRA, and CRIK programs, aid has been continued up to the 
present time.
The following quotation reveals the complicated nature
of foreign aid programs during the period from 1950 to 1953®
After the cessation of hostilities, and as soon as 
military circumstances permit, such responsibility 
will be transferred to UNKRA in addition to its 
present responsibility for longer term rehabilita­
tion. In addition, UNKRA is employing and paying 
staff personnel being furnished to the United 
Nations Civil Assistance Command during the period 
which that Command is responsible for emergency direct civilian re lief.21
With ICA funds, UNKRA in cooperation with the Office 
of Planning of the Korean Government, has planned a number 
of substantial rehabilitation projects for the Korean economy. 
These programs have been contributing to the control of 
inflation and to building up the basic industries of the 
Korean economy.
C. ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID PROGRAMS
With the exception of relief aids, up to 1955 the 
long-run aid programs (ECA, FOA, ICA, UNKRA) to Korea have 
contributed $393,047 thousand, as shown in Table XVIII, page
■^The Bank of Korea, o£. c i t ., IV, 221.
20‘' Mutual Security Agency, oj>. cit., p. 34. 21Ibid.
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TABLE XVIII
SUMMARY OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID AND 
RELIEF GOODS RECEIVED, 1945-1955
(In thousands of dollars)
U.S.A« U..N.Year Total g a r iOA ECA FOA ICA CRIK UNKRA
1945 4,934 4,934 — — ' — — —
1946 49,496 49,496 — — — — —
1947 175,371 175,371 — — — — —
1943 179,593 179,593 — — — — —
1949 116,509 92,703 23,306 — — — —
1950 53,706 ■ — 49,330 -- — 9,376
1951 106,420 — 10,030 21,892 __ 74,448 —
1952 159,739 — — 3,824 -- 155,534 381
1953 193,456 — — 232 5,571 158,787 28,366
1954 147,252 — — — 82,437 50,191 14,62 4
1955 243_»931 __ —. — 205,815 . _ 8,711 29.405
Total
1 ,435,407 502,097 83,216 25,948 293,823 457,047 73,276
Source: The Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Review, 1957a
(Korea: The Research Department, Bank of Korea, 1957),
I, 181.
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54, which presents a series of the various foreign aids 
during the period 1945-1955•
Table XVIII shows that substantial economic assis­
tance of over $476 million was a small amount compared with 
relief aid goods of $959 million through GARIOA and CRIK.
IGA. The operation of the Economic Cooperation 
Administration in Korea was terminated in 1951, succeeded 
by the Foreign Operation Administration and integrated with 
the International Cooperation Administration in 1953» Thus, 
data of these programs are available only to the ICA pro­
grams which are divided into project and nonproject activities.
On page 56, information shows that in project assistance 
the allocation to industry and mining in 1955 was more than 
three times the amount in 1954; for transportation it was 
nearly 50 times as much. In 1954, nonproject assistance was 
almost seven times over the project assistance and in the 
following year project assistance was almost equal to non­
project assistance.
UNKRA. For the purpose of reunifying Korea and 
reconstructing the economy, UNKRA was established* Since 
its establishment in 1950 UNKRA has contributed substantially 
to the Korean economy, nevertheless the major task of rebuild­
ing the economy remains to be done. UNKRA?s contribution to 
the long-run economic development in Korea during the period 
from 1952 to 1955 is shown in Table XX, page 57.
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TABLE XIX
STATUS OF ICA AID AND SUPPLIES RECEIVED, 1954-1955
A. Project Assistance 
(In thousands of dollars)
Project 1954 1955
Agriculture and Natural Resources $198 $3,404Industry and Mining 6,367 20,668
Transportation 1,305 62,024
Health and Sanitation 255 2,106
Education —  33
Social Welfare and Housing 1,570 7,330
Operating Cost 470 1,395
TOTAL $10,165 $96,960
B. Nonproject Assistance 
(In thousands of dollars)
Commodities 1953 1954 1955
Agricultural commodities $3,963 $23,405 $28,443
Fuels —  11,712 10,471
Raw materials and semi­
finished products 1,608 30,518 54,937
Investment salable
(cement, lumber, etc.) _____ —  6,637 15,004
TOTAL $5,571 $72,272 $108,855
Source; The Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Review, 1957. 
(Korea; The Research Department, Bank of Korea,' 1957),
IV, 222-25« These two tables are abridged copies of those 
appearing in these pages.
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TABLE IX
STATUS OF UNKRA AID AND SUPPLIES RECEIVED,
1952-1955
(In thousands of dollars)
Pro.iects 1?52 .1953 1954 1955
Agriculture $— $2,309 $1,375 521
Fishery 192 IS5 462 1,664
Industry — - 349 3,501 3,921
Electric Power _ _ 34 757 2,293
Transport and Communications— 2,260 2,636 521
Mining — 100 74S 2,059
Housing — 120 1,519 2,033
Education 1S9 3,630 1,930 2,0S9
Health and Welfare — 375 577 1,245
Commodities sustaining 
Civilian Supply — 19,504 1,11S 7,OS7
Personal Expenditure — — «... 1 __972
TOTAL $3Si $2S,S66 $14,624 I 29,405
Source: The Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Review, 1957,
(Korea: The Research Department, Bank of Korea, 1957),
IV, 226-27. This is an abridged copy of that appearing on these pages.
5S
In 1952, the UNKRA grants were not substantial, but 
it should be noted that 50 percent of such grants was allo­
cated to education. Owing to the Korean War, the small 
size of the aid program was influenced by UNKRATs policy
22
of "wait-and-see" before making substantial contributions.
In 1953, the proportion to industry was less than one-tenth 
of that to education; commodities sustaining civilian supply 
was receiving about 70 percent of the total grants. These 
programs, however, were supplemented after 1954 by aid from 
the United Nations and the United States, and the Korean 
government's reconstruction efforts.
23Other Economic Aid; Public Law 4S0. Public Law 1+80
was adopted July 10, 1956, as "the Agricultural Trade Devel-
24opment and Assistance Act of 1954°’* Section 2 of the Law 
says that
it is hereby declared . . .  to expand international 
trade among the United States and friendly nations, 
to facilitate the convertibility of currency, to 
promote the economic stability of American agricul­
ture and the national welfare, to make maximum 
efficient use of surplus agricultural commodities 
in furtherance of the foreign policy of the United 
States, and to stimulate and facilitate the expan­
sion of foreign trade in agricultural commodities
22Lewis, John P., Reconstruction and Development in 
South Korea, (Wash., D. C.s National Planning Association, 
1955), p. 36.
23United States Statutes at Large, S3 Cong., 2 Sess., 
1954, Vol. 6'S'.
24Ibid., p. 454.
59
which . . .  may be sold through private trade 
channels, and foreign currencies accepted in payment therefore.25
Fearing a serious decline in the prices of agricul­
tural products., the Korean National Assembly did not at that 
time favor this law as supplied to Korea, yet subsequently 
the government took advantage of Public Law 1+80 and applied 
for assistance. The law allows Korea, for instance, to buy 
American surplus goods in Korean currency. This means that 
Korea may benefit in two ways. One is that the government 
can save dollars. The other is that the Korean government 
may profit by buying ,at one price and selling at a higher 
one, both expressed in hwan.
Agreements between Korea and the United States under 
Public Law 480 were brought into existence in 1955. As a 
result of the agreement, Korea obtained commodities from the 
United States (Table XXI, page 60).
D. RECONSTRUCTION OF THE KOREAN ECONOMY
With the beginning of the original relief programs in 
Korea in 1945, the U.S. government has become increasingly 
interested in the reconstruction of the Korean economy. In 
1949, the long-run projects had begun with ECA programs.
But difficulties were compounded by problems of the unifica­
tion question and military operations which meant that
25Ibid.. pp. 454-55o
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TABLE XXI
EXCHANGE OF UeS. AGRICULTURAL SURPLUS GOODS 
TO KOREA UNDER PUBLIC LAW 480, 1955
(In thousands of dollars)
Commodities Agreement Actual Transactions
Raw Cotton $9,400 $7,694
Its Freightage 600 490
Leaf-tobacco 4,615 4,604
Its Freightage 3&5 244
TOTAL $15,000 $13,032
Source: The Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Review, 1957,
(Korea: The Research Department, Bank of Korea, 1957),
I, 198.
%
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economic programs had to give way to military priorities*
The foreign economic assistance agencies were hesitant in 
their activities and, as a result, little economic recon­
struction was achieved* But, by the end of 1952, authori­
ties had become aware of the need for long-run rehabilita­
tion programs for the Korean economy*
The essential reconstruction programs began with the 
Nathan reports on the economic situation of Korea which were 
released in December, 1952* The reports emphasized the need 
for a long-run reconstruction and aid program* In April,
1953» Henry J. Tasca, a special representative of the United 
States government, made another report on the reconstruction 
problems of Korea. These reports were used in :the writing
of a document which provided a long-run reconstruction plan26
for the Korean economy* President Eisenhower requested
from Congress an emergency appropriation of $200 million
27
for Korean relief and rehabilitation in August 1953*
However, the Korean War ceased and the Panmunjom 
truce was signed* The prospects for aid and reconstruction 
became brighter. At the same time, American economic activi­
ties in Korea became partially freed from the military* A 
veteran of the European Recovery and Mutual Security pro­
grams, C. Tyler Wood, became the director of the U.N.-U.S-
uewis, o£. cit., pp. 35-37* 
2^Ibid*, p. 3&*
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long-run projects for UNKRA and ICA in Korea.
Achievements of Projects. Even though foreign aid 
agencies have not been as successful as they might have been, 
they have contributed much to rebuilding the Korean economy.
The long-run projects of UNKRA and ICA contributed 
to the rebuilding of cotton mills, yarn spinning mills, and 
to the construction of a new woolen plant. Korean technicians 
have been trained by the project in order to operate these 
plants. By installing 13,430 cotton spindles at Taejon in 
1954, textile industries now have the capacity to meet the 
domestic demands for cotton yarn. Structural rehabilitation 
of the Samchok Cement Plant was completed in 1955, thus 
raising production from 60,000 metric-tons annually to 
about 100,000 metric-tons. Coal mining in the same year 
increased its output by 100,000 metric-tons. Metal mining 
was also improved and the Mineral Assay Laboratory at Taejon 
enlarged its facilities. Power was increased in 1955 by 
about 25 percent over 1954. Equipment and construction 
materials worth $250,000 for transportation were provided 
for building railway installations and for restoring highways 
and harbors. Through the irrigation of some 90,000 acres of
23Ibid.
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paddy land, rice output was increased by 30,000 metric-
29t ons annually.
Loan funds for promoting the fishing industry were 
provided by UNKRA. Furthermore, the establishment of Cen­
tral Forest Experiment Stations, housing projects, a text­
book printing plant, training programs for engineers and 
educators, and health service are excellent contributions 
from UNKRA and ICA.
Foreign economic aid by projects in Korea is set forth 
in Table XXII, page 64« This table shows that commodities 
for civilian supply amounted to $1,469 thousand, whereas 
installation projects totaled only $2Sl thousand for the 
years from 1945 to 1956. That is, four-fifths of the total 
foreign aid has been allocated to commodities for civilian 
supply and one-fifth to installation projects.
Although Korea needed consumption goods for relief, 
she needed capital equipment even more. For one reason, 
when the Japanese withdrew from the Korean peninsula, they 
took much of the capital with them. A second reason was the 
destruction of the capital facilities during the Korean War.
A third reason was the adoption of a "wait-and-see" policy 
by the authorities during the war. A fourth reason was the
^United Nations, Report of the Agent General of the 
United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency for the period 
i September 1954 to 30: June 1 9 5$, Tenth Sess., Supplement 
IS. New York, 1955» PP*> 2-11.
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TABLE XXII
FOREIGN AID TO KOREA BY PROJECTS, 1945-1956 
(In thousands of dollars)
Classification Installation Commodities for
of Funds_______ Pro.jects____ Civilian Supply Others Total
GARIOA #30 #379 #-- #409
ECA 6 170 —  176
FOA .2 26 ~  26.2
ICA 187 372 5 564
UNKRA 57 32 6 95
CRIK -- 457 —  457
Public Law 4^0 --_______________13__________ zz______ 33
TOTAL #280.2 #1,469 #11 $1,760.2
Source: The Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Review. 1957.
(Korea: The Research Department, Bank of Korea, 1957),
I, 182.
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complications that arose from the operation of aid programs
by so many different authorities<> The ICA program, for
example, had three divided authorities which were comprised
of the State Department, the White House, and the U.S. Army.
A fifth and final reason was the poor administration of
agency operations. For instance, under the auspices of ICA
and the Korean government foreign aid goods were disposed
through a lottery system. The winner received the equivalent
of a million dollars for aid goods and even the losers were
sure of getting their money back. The local currency was
valued at the official rate for the lottery system, no
matter what the real exchange value may be. Thus, the
operation enabled a few fortunate entrepreneurs to make a
sizable profit with no risks. A million dollars of foreign
aid was being diverted every year from constructive purposes,
and the Korean people and the agencies were losers. Fortu-30
nately, the lottery system was abolished in May of 1957.
30Edmundson, Charles, "Don’t Make Korea Another China,” 
The Reporter, October 31, 1957, pp. 31-34.
CHAPTER IV
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Since the liberation of 1945, the Korean economy has 
been handicapped in three main respects; the Japanese ex­
ploitation, 1910-1945, the separation of the peninsula at 
the 33th parallel, and the Korean War of 1950-1953•
The Korean postwar experience may be traced to the 
provisions of the Cairo Conference in 1943 that "in due 
course Korea shall become free and independent,” and the 
renewal of the Cairo declaration by the Potsdam Declaration 
in 1945» To fulfill the Cairo and Potsdam promises, the 
Soviet and American troops were landed in the peninsula at 
the close of the Second World War. In the meantime, an 
artificial border was marked off along the 33th parallel on 
the peninsula.
Since 1945, Korea’s future has become more complicated 
and uncertain because of the conflict between the Soviet 
Union and the United States. The southern zone was organized 
as the Republic of Korea in August, 1943. This action was 
sponsored by the United States. The northern zone was set 
up in September, 1943, as the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea. This action was sponsored by the Soviet Union.
No trade or communication has since taken place between the
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two zones. What was a "convenient” demarcation line along 
the 36th parallel had, by 1946, become a boundary line 
separating two arbitrarily created nations. This separation 
has resulted in an effort to develop two independent econo­
mies; one is mainly agricultural and the other mainly indus­
trial.
Lack of trade and communication between the two econo­
mies is seriously handicapping the development of each zone. 
Until the 36th parallel is abolished there can be no unified 
Korea and a rational development of the economy. The result 
of separation at the 36th parallel was the Korean War of
1950-1953* resulting in damages to southern Korea alone of
1
about $1.6 billion. The war forced Korea to allocate a 
large portion of its budget for national defense. Stemming 
from the damages done and the heavy defense budget, strong 
inflationary pressures have since developed. ' Thus, the 
political division has been a fundamental influence in 
magnifying Korea’s economic problems. The war was one of 
those minor conflicts reflecting the cold war conflict 
between the great powers of the world, much as it is being 
reflected by the Middle East situation today.
Under the Korean situation described above, foreign 
aid was begun in 1945, and by 1955 it totaled more than
1See page 37»
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$1.4 billion. An annual average of 10 percent of the
Korean gross national product was made up of foreign aid
during the period 1945-1955. Industries that were built
up by aid from foreign sources include textiles, minerals,
sugar, plastic, rubber, leather, paper, soap, and dyestuffs;
some of the funds were employed to restore or promote irriga
tion and fisheries. With a favorable government economic
policy, foreign aid has greatly contributed to an increase
in the gross national product. The national product reached
482,409 million hwan in 1953» 529,485 hwan in 1954, and
563,317 hwan in 1955« Per capita income amounted to 23,127
3hwan in 1953, 25,000 in 1954, and 26,169 in 1955.
Regardless of the economic progress reflected in 
gross national product and per capita income, certain defi­
ciencies appeared in the economy. Most important of these 
deficiencies were the following:
1. A large percentage of the national budget was 
allocated to the national defense.
Annually this allocation has reached as much as 40 
4percent. The amount of foreign aid, it should be noted, is
5
estimated to be around 40 percent of the national budget.
2See Table XVIII, page 54.
^See Table XVI, page 4 6.
^See Table XII, page 3 6.
5Ibid.
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Thus, foreign aid is equivalent to the appropriation for 
national defense.
2. Ineffective administration has failed to reach 
a desirable goal for the economy.
Generally speaking, the government officers were not 
trained for administrative management. Engineers were scarce. 
There was no systematically planned development program.
3. Foreign aid to Korea was ineffective.
During the period 1945-1955, essential economic
assistance amounted to more than $476 million, and relief6
aid amounted to more than $959 million. The amount desig­
nated for economic assistance was inadequate to meet the need 
for replenishing capital and reconstructing basic industries. 
On the other hand, Korea originally was not in dire need of 
relief goods but she did need capital equipment.
Koreans are now aware of a fait accompli of their 
nation. They would like to give further consideration to 
possible reduction of the defense appropriation, to re­
organization of an effective administration, to introduction 
of an effective foreign economic aid, to checking inflation, 
to reduction of imports of consumer goods and an increased 
capital investment for industrialization, and the develop­
ment of a self-supporting economy. By consideration of 
these problems, steps could be taken to improve the produc-
^See Table XVIII, page 54<>
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tive capacity in industry, agriculture, mining, and fish­
eries* Increased output and reduced government spendings 
with effective economic assistance would lessen the infla­
tionary tendencies, improve the national economy, and help 
to restore economic independence, even if the economy is 
less than optimal because of the fact of division.
Koreans believe that democracy is not a mere political 
theory but a way of life. Koreans believe that north and 
south Korea will *'in due course” be one nation. Koreans 
would like to wait patiently for those days and to contri­
bute to the making of a Family of Men.
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